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Billieux et al. (2015) propose that the recent proliferation of behavioral addictions has been driven by deficiencies 
in the underlying research strategy. This commentary considers how pathological gambling (now termed gambling 
disorder) traversed these challenges to become the first recognized behavioral addiction in the DSM-5. Ironically, 
many similar issues continue to exist in research on gambling disorder, including question-marks over the validity of 
tolerance, heterogeneity in gambling motives, and the under-specification of neuroimaging biomarkers. Neverthe-
less, I contend that the case for gambling disorder as a behavioral addiction has been bolstered by the existence of 
clear and consistent functional impairment (primarily in  the form of debt), coupled with the development of a public 
health approach that has given emphasis to product features (i.e. the structural characteristics of gambling forms) as 
much as individual dispositions (the ‘addictive personality’).
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Billieux, Schimmenti, Khazaal, Maurage and Heeren (2015) 
articulately explain how the recent proliferation of soft be-
havioral addictions could arise from a circular research ap-
proach, involving 3 stages. The first step is the derivation of 
a screening tool, based on adapting established criteria for 
substance use disorders. The second step is the confirma-
tion in epidemiological datasets that some prevalence of the 
putative addiction exists in the general population. The third 
step is the testing for neurocognitive markers in the putative 
addiction, when those markers are themselves derived from 
the same essential criteria (albeit in substance use disor-
ders). The widespread emergence of this approach has likely 
been fueled by the ratification of ‘behavioral addiction’ via 
the case of gambling disorder (previously termed pathologi-
cal gambling) in the DSM-5 (Petry et al., 2014). 
Billieux et al. (2015) imply that this current conceptual-
ization of gambling disorder was validated by “decades of 
empirical research”. Reading their article, I was prompted 
to reconsider how (or indeed whether) gambling disorder 
successfully overcame these hurdles that other putative be-
havioral addictions now face. Certainly, similar controversy 
existed around the time that the DSM-III introduced the 
pathological gambling diagnosis in 1980 (Lesieur, 1984). 
Indeed, when taken in isolation, many specific lines of evi-
dence in gambling disorder remain open to criticisms analo-
gous to those raised by Billieux et al. (2015). I will con-
sider three examples. First, Billieux et al. (2015) question 
the validity of tolerance in behavioral addictions. Tolerance 
is often regarded as one of the hallmarks of an addiction 
syndrome (Shaffer et al., 2004). In the case of gambling, in-
dividuals with gambling disorder clearly play with progres-
sively larger sums of money over time, and many screen-
ing instruments include an item that refers to escalating bet 
size. However, this effect may have a distinct motivation 
from the phenomenon in substance use disorders, where an 
opponent process causes the addicted individual to require 
higher doses of drug to achieve the same subjective effect. 
In gambling disorder, it is not clear that the increasing wa-
gers are necessary for need satisfaction; an accumulation 
of debt may entirely justify the need to escalate one’s bet 
(Blaszczynski, Walker, Sharpe & Nower, 2008). 
Second, Billieux et al. (2015) propose that a common 
symptom presentation (e.g. of multiplayer online game ad-
diction) can arise from profoundly different psychological 
motives. Such heterogeneity in motives clearly also exists 
in gambling disorder. Factor analytic studies differentiate 
coping motives (gambling to escape), enhancement motives 
(gambling for excitement) and socializing motives (Stewart 
& Zack, 2008), with some dispute over the place of money 
as a motivating factor (Flack & Morris, 2014). Different 
preferred forms of gambling and mental health co-morbid-
ities may align with these motives (Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2002) with implications for treatment tailoring.
Third, the search for biomarkers for gambling disorder 
has entered an interesting phase. Using functional MRI, a 
substantial number of studies have focused attention on the 
‘brain reward system’ (centered on the ventral striatum and 
medial prefrontal cortex) but the direction of group differ-
ences in these regions is inconsistent (Limbrick-Oldfield, 
Van Holst & Clark, 2013). A similar number of studies 
describe over- and under-activity in groups with gambling 
disorder; results tend to be interpreted with two distinct 
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theoretical positions, reward deficiency versus incentive sa-
lience (Leyton & Vezina, 2013). PET data looking at brain 
neurochemistry are even stranger, where dopamine tracers 
yield little overlap in the signature of gambling disorder 
and substance use disorders (Boileau et al., 2014; Clark et 
al., 2012). One possibility is that the effects in substance 
use disorders are drug-induced (e.g. cocaine neurotoxicity). 
Another distinct possibility is that the biomedical model of 
addictions represent an over-simplification in the case of 
gambling disorder (c.f. Hall, Carter & Forlini, 2015; Nutt, 
Lingford-Hughes, Erritzoe & Stokes, 2015).
One salient riposte to these debates comes in the form of 
functional impairment. For clinicians, this point goes with-
out saying; clients do not present to services seeking help 
without some form of functional impairment (this may be 
perceived by family or the legal system rather than directly 
by the individual). In the case of gambling disorder, finan-
cial debt is ubiquitous, crippling, and pernicious, drawing 
friends and family quickly into the spiral of harms. It is not 
uncommon for individuals with gambling disorder to be-
come homeless, attempt suicide or resort to crime, as direct 
responses to their mounting debts (Clark & Walker, 2009; 
Manning et al., 2015; Sharman, Dreyer, Aitken, Clark & 
Bowden-Jones, 2015). These objective harms contrast with 
the subjective, transient and contextual distress that is often 
described for other putative behavioral addictions.
A public health model provides a further perspective, by 
emphasizing how harms arise through the interaction of indi-
vidual risk factors and features of the addictive agent (Korn 
& Shaffer, 1999). In the specific case of gambling, this can 
be expressed as the interplay of the ‘gambler and the game’, 
or the ‘player and the product’ (Clark, 2014). The addictions 
framework is grounded in a biomedical model that may give 
disproportionate weight to individual vulnerabilities, which 
effectively aims to characterize the ‘addictive personality’ 
in neurobiological and psychological terms. But within this 
framework – and in the continued absence of clear biomark-
ers – any excessive behavior can be considered an addic-
tion, and thus the slippery slope beckons. By understanding 
how product features act on the consumer, this may help 
impose some thresholds on the slippery slope. In the case 
of drug addiction, it is clear for example that the addictive 
potential of tobacco is vastly different when nicotine is ad-
ministered in the form of cigarettes as opposed to chewing 
tobacco (Edwards, 2005). In the case of gambling games, 
various structural characteristics have been identified, such 
as speed of play (Chóliz, 2010), near-miss features (Clark, 
Lawrence, Astley-Jones & Gray, 2009) or illusion of control 
devices (Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005). There is increasing 
evidence that at least some of these features are linked to 
the addictive potential of different forms of gambling, and 
modulate brain activity in the same regions affected by indi-
vidual vulnerability factors. 
A similar approach is proving fruitful in the case of 
video gaming (especially online gaming). Some features 
are shared across gambling games and video games (e.g. 
reinforcement schedules), while others are specific (e.g. ad-
vancement of the avatar in video games) (King, Delfabbro 
& Griffiths, 2009). In the case of ‘food addiction’ or binge 
eating, it may also be possible to relate sugar, salt or fat 
content of foods to behavioral models of consumption in a 
way that at least generates a tractable program of research 
and falsifiable hypotheses (Avena, Gearhardt, Gold, Wang 
& Potenza, 2012; Ziauddeen, Farooqi & Fletcher, 2012). 
It is less convincing whether or how such product features 
should be conceptualized for other putative behavioral ad-
dictions, such as ‘work addiction’ or ‘tango addiction’. 
Thus, and in conclusion, any blueprint for behavioral addic-
tions research would benefit from an increased emphasis on 
the psychological properties of addictive products.
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